Domestic imperatives in Iran's foreign policy
By: Hamid Ansari
A new exercise in consensus building is under way. The purpose is to present a unified approach and deny the interlocutor space to exploit internal disagreements.
IRAN'S HISTORICAL memory is riveted on foreign interference. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic and the Testament of Imam Khomeini are prescriptive on this score. So are the pronouncements of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and virtually every strand of domestic opinion. Foreign policy moves are thus scrutinised minutely and put to the litmus test of interference and dependency.
Other elements of behaviour pattern also come into play. One need not share Curzon's attribution of "scientific imposture" to analyse a thought process historically focussed on philosophies of dualism of good and evil, of exoteric and esoteric, of zaher and baten (external manifestation and internal reality). The public discourse in Iran has seen manifestations of each of these in recent weeks.
Nor is the domestic scene free of contentions and pressures. In what can be interpreted as serious and purposeful bickering in the ranks of the clergy, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was heckled at a research institute in Qum and left without completing his speech. Elsewhere, trouble has been reported from the Azeri, Arab, and Baluch segments of the public. Its seriousness is contested. In Khuzistan, some dissidents were executed. In Sistan-Baluchistan, the Jundullah leader Abdol-Malek Regi gained publicity in May when he released some government officials it had kidnapped earlier. The cartoons considered derogatory by the Azeris were a manifestation of Persian chauvinism of older vintage. The Azeris remain well represented in the power structure of the Islamic republic. The much publicised June 12 protest by women demanding equal rights in marriage, divorce, and custody of children signalled gender awareness but remains confined to a fringe group.
The expectation in some quarters is that these, along with human right issues, could be instrumental in enhancing `democratic' pressure and lead to regime change. Teheran, however, views this differently, as signalling the need for reinforcing solidarity in the face of evident external interference.
Nor are the moves all defensive. A new and bold privatisation plan has been announced this week in the name of the Supreme Leader. Under this, about 80 per cent of the government's stakes in industrial units, banking, media, transportation, and mineral sectors are to be divested. These would not cover the oil, defence industry, and some banking and civil aviation units. The test of the new approach, obviously linked to WTO admission, would lie in implementation. The pockets of resistance would be many.
While substantive reactions are yet to emerge, the complexity of gestures is suggestive of a game plan. There is a studied procrastination of response to the 5+1 package of June 6. In the meantime, President Ahmadinejad has attended the SCO summit at Beijing and the African summit at Banjul, Iran and Saudi Arabia have communicated about Muslim solidarity (spelt out by Iran's former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati as "exchange of opinions and views between these two major Shia and Sunni countries" to neutralise moves by extremist elements), and the Saudis have publicly cautioned against the use of force against Iran and its disastrous impact on oil prices.
In a move not unrelated to the larger issue, Deputy Oil Minister Mohammad Hadi Nejad Hosseinian dropped on July 1 a broad hint on the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline stressing that the available quantities of gas could either be sold to India-Pakistan or to Europe, but no to both. The remark is relevant because of the delays in pipeline talks and also because of the post-Ukraine European moves to seek alternatives to reduce dependence on Russian supplies.
A new Foreign Policy Advisory Council has been created through a formal decree because the Supreme Leader "sensed a deficiency of lack of strategy in foreign relations" and in the implementation of policy decisions. This five-member body is headed by former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi and includes Mr. Velayati and former Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani. Mr. Velayati is Ayatollah Khamenei's principal foreign policy adviser. The council's five-year tenure would outlast that of the President. Its creation carries multiple signals, substantive and procedural.
A new exercise at consensus building, led by the Supreme Leader himself, is under way. At a critical juncture in the history of modern Iran, the purpose is to present a unified approach and deny to the interlocutor space to exploit internal disagreements. Another, typically Iranian, purpose may be to diffuse the actual locus of decision-making and keep the interlocutor guessing.
The tenor of initial pronouncements is to be noted. President Ahmadinejad set the date of response in mid-August. The Iranian response, said one official, would be general rather than specific, would be for talks but not with preconditions, and suspension of uranium enrichment would be out of question. Could then a dignified solution be sought through "a technical break" to allow negotiations to start? Saud Al-Faisal's visit to Teheran and chief negotiator Ali Larijani's visits to Cairo and Algiers could not be purposeless. Nor is Oman's low profile diplomacy to be ignored.
By the end of June, the first reactions were spelt out. "We do not negotiate with anybody on achieving and exploiting nuclear technology," said Ayatollah Khamenei. "But if they recognise our nuclear rights, we are ready to negotiate about controls, supervisions and international guarantees." Mr. Velayati amplified it: "Iran will certainly not suspend uranium enrichment; this is a definite and constant policy and no one would be prepared to step down from it." He stressed the centrality of Iran to West Asia, and of the latter to the world. Both the Supreme Leader and his foreign policy adviser also signalled a disinterest in negotiations with the Americans.
The Iranians remain alert to score points. An invitation by some EU parliamentarians to the MKO leader Maryam Rajavi was used by Mr. Larijani on July 5 to cancel, on security grounds, his visit to Brussels for talks with EU foreign and security policy chief Javier Solana. Immediately thereafter, he accepted from the latter ("to show goodwill") a dinner invitation for July 7!
Some conclusions, albeit tentative, tend to emerge. They relate to the politics, purpose, procedure, and content of discussions. Both sides now concede the need for talks. Beyond this, perceptions diverge.
The U.S. (a) retains a formal insistence on compliance — suspension of enrichment — before discussions; (b) may wish to defer regime change for the moment in return for a change in the behaviour of the regime; (c) may attempt to use the signal for talks as a means of pressure on the regime to cause internal dissensions; (d) is unwilling to rule out the military option; (e) is not willing to talk about security guarantees; and (f) is patient in the face of initial Iranian reactions but wants its range of options to be registered.
The EU, supportive of the U.S. on enrichment, is anxious for progress in talks, is apprehensive of the consequences of a breakdown, is willing to concede some ground on Iranian concerns on security, wants Security Council pressure to be incremental and reversible, wants to maintain international consensus, is ambivalent on the military option of the Americans. The Russians and the Chinese have substantial economic and strategic stakes in Iran, oppose military action, are hesitant on economic sanctions, do not wish Iran to progress to the level of nuclear weaponry, want Iran to be included in the general security framework for the Persian Gulf-Caucasus-Central Asia regions, do not wish to have this question make an adverse impact on their relations with the U.S.
Arab reaction
Contradictory emotions characterise the Arab world. In the wake of Iraq, public sentiment is supportive of Iran's defiant posture and of its claim to acquire technology. The GCC states, apprehensive of Iran's size and potential, do not relish the prospect of a nuclear neighbour across the Persian Gulf and want the sub-region declared a nuclear weapon free zone. Further away, however, countries like Egypt, Syria and other members of the Arab League wish to use the opportunity to focus on Israel's nuclear weapons and lead the debate towards a WMD-free West Asia.
From Iran's viewpoint, the situation presents opportunities for manoeuvre. Having strengthened its domestic support base on nationalist fervour, and used the nuclear issue to propel America to the negotiating table, its effort now would be to develop an approach that mixes obstinacy with flexibility to retain the focus on the strategic objective to use the nuclear talks for (a) a wider dialogue; (b) seeking recognition of its security interests in the region and — by implication — legitimacy; (c) signalling inflexibility on the enrichment question to exploit its full potential till an "acceptable" package is offered. The fractured international consensus would assist the process. So would the unravelling situation in Iraq. So would its centrality to the Persian Gulf-Caspian basins and its proven oil and gas reserves.
A total American success on Iran would have a decisive impact on the geopolitics of West and Central Asia and on the strategic interests of Russia and China. A total failure would do likewise. Given the stakes and the uncertainties, would the powers play for a draw? Would Iran assist such an outcome? [The Hindu, Wednesday, Jul 12, 2006 ]
A new exercise in consensus building is under way. The purpose is to present a unified approach and deny the interlocutor space to exploit internal disagreements.
IRAN'S HISTORICAL memory is riveted on foreign interference. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic and the Testament of Imam Khomeini are prescriptive on this score. So are the pronouncements of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and virtually every strand of domestic opinion. Foreign policy moves are thus scrutinised minutely and put to the litmus test of interference and dependency.
Other elements of behaviour pattern also come into play. One need not share Curzon's attribution of "scientific imposture" to analyse a thought process historically focussed on philosophies of dualism of good and evil, of exoteric and esoteric, of zaher and baten (external manifestation and internal reality). The public discourse in Iran has seen manifestations of each of these in recent weeks.
Nor is the domestic scene free of contentions and pressures. In what can be interpreted as serious and purposeful bickering in the ranks of the clergy, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was heckled at a research institute in Qum and left without completing his speech. Elsewhere, trouble has been reported from the Azeri, Arab, and Baluch segments of the public. Its seriousness is contested. In Khuzistan, some dissidents were executed. In Sistan-Baluchistan, the Jundullah leader Abdol-Malek Regi gained publicity in May when he released some government officials it had kidnapped earlier. The cartoons considered derogatory by the Azeris were a manifestation of Persian chauvinism of older vintage. The Azeris remain well represented in the power structure of the Islamic republic. The much publicised June 12 protest by women demanding equal rights in marriage, divorce, and custody of children signalled gender awareness but remains confined to a fringe group.
The expectation in some quarters is that these, along with human right issues, could be instrumental in enhancing `democratic' pressure and lead to regime change. Teheran, however, views this differently, as signalling the need for reinforcing solidarity in the face of evident external interference.
Nor are the moves all defensive. A new and bold privatisation plan has been announced this week in the name of the Supreme Leader. Under this, about 80 per cent of the government's stakes in industrial units, banking, media, transportation, and mineral sectors are to be divested. These would not cover the oil, defence industry, and some banking and civil aviation units. The test of the new approach, obviously linked to WTO admission, would lie in implementation. The pockets of resistance would be many.
While substantive reactions are yet to emerge, the complexity of gestures is suggestive of a game plan. There is a studied procrastination of response to the 5+1 package of June 6. In the meantime, President Ahmadinejad has attended the SCO summit at Beijing and the African summit at Banjul, Iran and Saudi Arabia have communicated about Muslim solidarity (spelt out by Iran's former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati as "exchange of opinions and views between these two major Shia and Sunni countries" to neutralise moves by extremist elements), and the Saudis have publicly cautioned against the use of force against Iran and its disastrous impact on oil prices.
In a move not unrelated to the larger issue, Deputy Oil Minister Mohammad Hadi Nejad Hosseinian dropped on July 1 a broad hint on the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline stressing that the available quantities of gas could either be sold to India-Pakistan or to Europe, but no to both. The remark is relevant because of the delays in pipeline talks and also because of the post-Ukraine European moves to seek alternatives to reduce dependence on Russian supplies.
A new Foreign Policy Advisory Council has been created through a formal decree because the Supreme Leader "sensed a deficiency of lack of strategy in foreign relations" and in the implementation of policy decisions. This five-member body is headed by former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi and includes Mr. Velayati and former Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani. Mr. Velayati is Ayatollah Khamenei's principal foreign policy adviser. The council's five-year tenure would outlast that of the President. Its creation carries multiple signals, substantive and procedural.
A new exercise at consensus building, led by the Supreme Leader himself, is under way. At a critical juncture in the history of modern Iran, the purpose is to present a unified approach and deny to the interlocutor space to exploit internal disagreements. Another, typically Iranian, purpose may be to diffuse the actual locus of decision-making and keep the interlocutor guessing.
The tenor of initial pronouncements is to be noted. President Ahmadinejad set the date of response in mid-August. The Iranian response, said one official, would be general rather than specific, would be for talks but not with preconditions, and suspension of uranium enrichment would be out of question. Could then a dignified solution be sought through "a technical break" to allow negotiations to start? Saud Al-Faisal's visit to Teheran and chief negotiator Ali Larijani's visits to Cairo and Algiers could not be purposeless. Nor is Oman's low profile diplomacy to be ignored.
By the end of June, the first reactions were spelt out. "We do not negotiate with anybody on achieving and exploiting nuclear technology," said Ayatollah Khamenei. "But if they recognise our nuclear rights, we are ready to negotiate about controls, supervisions and international guarantees." Mr. Velayati amplified it: "Iran will certainly not suspend uranium enrichment; this is a definite and constant policy and no one would be prepared to step down from it." He stressed the centrality of Iran to West Asia, and of the latter to the world. Both the Supreme Leader and his foreign policy adviser also signalled a disinterest in negotiations with the Americans.
The Iranians remain alert to score points. An invitation by some EU parliamentarians to the MKO leader Maryam Rajavi was used by Mr. Larijani on July 5 to cancel, on security grounds, his visit to Brussels for talks with EU foreign and security policy chief Javier Solana. Immediately thereafter, he accepted from the latter ("to show goodwill") a dinner invitation for July 7!
Some conclusions, albeit tentative, tend to emerge. They relate to the politics, purpose, procedure, and content of discussions. Both sides now concede the need for talks. Beyond this, perceptions diverge.
The U.S. (a) retains a formal insistence on compliance — suspension of enrichment — before discussions; (b) may wish to defer regime change for the moment in return for a change in the behaviour of the regime; (c) may attempt to use the signal for talks as a means of pressure on the regime to cause internal dissensions; (d) is unwilling to rule out the military option; (e) is not willing to talk about security guarantees; and (f) is patient in the face of initial Iranian reactions but wants its range of options to be registered.
The EU, supportive of the U.S. on enrichment, is anxious for progress in talks, is apprehensive of the consequences of a breakdown, is willing to concede some ground on Iranian concerns on security, wants Security Council pressure to be incremental and reversible, wants to maintain international consensus, is ambivalent on the military option of the Americans. The Russians and the Chinese have substantial economic and strategic stakes in Iran, oppose military action, are hesitant on economic sanctions, do not wish Iran to progress to the level of nuclear weaponry, want Iran to be included in the general security framework for the Persian Gulf-Caucasus-Central Asia regions, do not wish to have this question make an adverse impact on their relations with the U.S.
Arab reaction
Contradictory emotions characterise the Arab world. In the wake of Iraq, public sentiment is supportive of Iran's defiant posture and of its claim to acquire technology. The GCC states, apprehensive of Iran's size and potential, do not relish the prospect of a nuclear neighbour across the Persian Gulf and want the sub-region declared a nuclear weapon free zone. Further away, however, countries like Egypt, Syria and other members of the Arab League wish to use the opportunity to focus on Israel's nuclear weapons and lead the debate towards a WMD-free West Asia.
From Iran's viewpoint, the situation presents opportunities for manoeuvre. Having strengthened its domestic support base on nationalist fervour, and used the nuclear issue to propel America to the negotiating table, its effort now would be to develop an approach that mixes obstinacy with flexibility to retain the focus on the strategic objective to use the nuclear talks for (a) a wider dialogue; (b) seeking recognition of its security interests in the region and — by implication — legitimacy; (c) signalling inflexibility on the enrichment question to exploit its full potential till an "acceptable" package is offered. The fractured international consensus would assist the process. So would the unravelling situation in Iraq. So would its centrality to the Persian Gulf-Caspian basins and its proven oil and gas reserves.
A total American success on Iran would have a decisive impact on the geopolitics of West and Central Asia and on the strategic interests of Russia and China. A total failure would do likewise. Given the stakes and the uncertainties, would the powers play for a draw? Would Iran assist such an outcome? [The Hindu, Wednesday, Jul 12, 2006 ]
posted by e-tafakkur at 1:40 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home