The U.S. and the strategy for freedom
By Hamid Ansari
A remarkable feature of U.S. perceptions of West Asia is an inability or unwillingness to acknowledge linkages.
IT WAS proclaimed with fanfare, accompanied by comprehensive packaging, G-8 support, and high pressure salesmanship. Arab governments were apprehensive, Arab conservatives suspicious, Arab liberals hopeful. An overt exercise at external pressure to bring about internal change in a whole region was watched in awe by the world.
An Arab assessment, two years later, has been made this week by Abdul Bari Atwan, the much respected editor of the Al Quds Al Arabi daily published from London. Recent U.S. action in relation to Libya (resumption of diplomatic relations), Egypt (welcoming Gamal Mubarak in Washington) and Palestine (starving Hamas into submission), he writes, has undermined altogether the credibility of the initiative.
Mr. Atwan's comment is pin-pointed: "The American administration is using democracy and neo-liberal Arab as a pressure card on Arab dictatorships which it has supported and the violations of which it has disregarded for the past 50 years to achieve three main goals: the first is maintaining Israel's position as a regional superpower and normalising relations with it; the second is keeping the oil flowing and stopping any regional force that threatens America's dominance over its pipelines, reserves and sources; and the third is fighting terror and by terror it means Islamic fundamentalist terror, and keeping any moderate or extremist Islamic movement from coming to power if it does not accept America's plan in the region."
As a result of this policy of starvation, support for dictatorships, and human rights violations, says Mr. Atwan, "extremism is growing, the world has become less safe and Al-Qaeda is getting stronger by the day and its ideology is spreading."
He hints that more Al-Qaedas would emerge "if American missiles were to be directed at Iran."
The frustration, and apprehension, in the Arab world is evident and has not been drowned in the massive inflow of enhanced oil revenue and hyper-activity in regional stock markets.
Other commentators take a benign view and consider the present situation as a lull during which the lessons of the first phase of the reform process are being digested by the public and the regimes.
Mr. Atwan's assessment of the U.S. confirms earlier readings. In October 2005, the holder of the Anwar Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland, Shibley Telhami, and Zorby International had conducted an opinion poll in six Arab countries — Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Over 60 per cent believed that democracy promotion was not the real U.S objective.
It was, instead, oil (76 per cent), promotion of Israel (68 per cent), domination (63 per cent) and weakening of the Muslim world (59 per cent). Seventy per cent viewed Israel as the greatest threat to them followed by the U.S. (63 per cent), and Iran (6 per cent). Sixty per cent felt that pressure on Iran should cease even though 43 per cent shared the view that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. A more recent phenomenon is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's popularity on the Arab street.
American views are considerably at variance. Two basic questions have been repeatedly addressed: does democracy promotion serve U.S. interests? If so, how should such a policy be implemented? The answer in 2006 (unlike 2003-2004) is that democracy cannot be imposed from outside and that American interest is better served by gradual and calibrated change whose pace would be determined by the regimes themselves. Promotion, in an activist sense, seems to have been put aside.
Those who believed to the contrary thus feel betrayed.
A remarkable feature of U.S. perceptions of West Asia is an inability or unwillingness to acknowledge linkages.
A good example of this is a bland assertion by a Council for Foreign Relations Task Force: "The United States should support democratic reform in the Middle East whether or not there is progress towards peace, as well as support progress towards peace whether or not there is significant democratic reform." A close examination of the track record would show that neither is viewed as relevant to the larger American purpose.
The retreat from the agenda of 2003 was forced upon by the Iraq misadventure. The Bush-Blair partnership has finally, albeit grudgingly, conceded that mistakes were made, that Abu Ghraib happened, that the Marines massacred innocent civilians, that resistance exists and was underestimated. The fallacy of the primary impulse, a conspiracy to invade and destroy Iraq, is yet to be acknowledged.
Even friends are distancing themselves. A remark attributed to Abraham Foxman of the anti-Defamation League is noteworthy: "We are basically telling the president: we appreciate (your pledge to defend Israel), we welcome it. But hey, because there is this debate about Iraq, where people are trying to put the blame on us, may be you shouldn't say it that often or that loud. Within the Jewish community there is a real sense of `thank you but no thank you.'"
Would a changing situation propel the U.S. administration to take the Israel-Palestine question more realistically and tell Israel that peace, and permanent borders, need to be negotiated with the Palestinians, not with the U.S.? This one act, leading to freedom from occupation, fear, and anarchy, would do more to promote freedom, peace, democracy and a better image of America than all the half-baked initiatives put together. [The Hindu, Friday, Jun 02, 2006]
A remarkable feature of U.S. perceptions of West Asia is an inability or unwillingness to acknowledge linkages.
IT WAS proclaimed with fanfare, accompanied by comprehensive packaging, G-8 support, and high pressure salesmanship. Arab governments were apprehensive, Arab conservatives suspicious, Arab liberals hopeful. An overt exercise at external pressure to bring about internal change in a whole region was watched in awe by the world.
An Arab assessment, two years later, has been made this week by Abdul Bari Atwan, the much respected editor of the Al Quds Al Arabi daily published from London. Recent U.S. action in relation to Libya (resumption of diplomatic relations), Egypt (welcoming Gamal Mubarak in Washington) and Palestine (starving Hamas into submission), he writes, has undermined altogether the credibility of the initiative.
Mr. Atwan's comment is pin-pointed: "The American administration is using democracy and neo-liberal Arab as a pressure card on Arab dictatorships which it has supported and the violations of which it has disregarded for the past 50 years to achieve three main goals: the first is maintaining Israel's position as a regional superpower and normalising relations with it; the second is keeping the oil flowing and stopping any regional force that threatens America's dominance over its pipelines, reserves and sources; and the third is fighting terror and by terror it means Islamic fundamentalist terror, and keeping any moderate or extremist Islamic movement from coming to power if it does not accept America's plan in the region."
As a result of this policy of starvation, support for dictatorships, and human rights violations, says Mr. Atwan, "extremism is growing, the world has become less safe and Al-Qaeda is getting stronger by the day and its ideology is spreading."
He hints that more Al-Qaedas would emerge "if American missiles were to be directed at Iran."
The frustration, and apprehension, in the Arab world is evident and has not been drowned in the massive inflow of enhanced oil revenue and hyper-activity in regional stock markets.
Other commentators take a benign view and consider the present situation as a lull during which the lessons of the first phase of the reform process are being digested by the public and the regimes.
Mr. Atwan's assessment of the U.S. confirms earlier readings. In October 2005, the holder of the Anwar Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland, Shibley Telhami, and Zorby International had conducted an opinion poll in six Arab countries — Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Over 60 per cent believed that democracy promotion was not the real U.S objective.
It was, instead, oil (76 per cent), promotion of Israel (68 per cent), domination (63 per cent) and weakening of the Muslim world (59 per cent). Seventy per cent viewed Israel as the greatest threat to them followed by the U.S. (63 per cent), and Iran (6 per cent). Sixty per cent felt that pressure on Iran should cease even though 43 per cent shared the view that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. A more recent phenomenon is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's popularity on the Arab street.
American views are considerably at variance. Two basic questions have been repeatedly addressed: does democracy promotion serve U.S. interests? If so, how should such a policy be implemented? The answer in 2006 (unlike 2003-2004) is that democracy cannot be imposed from outside and that American interest is better served by gradual and calibrated change whose pace would be determined by the regimes themselves. Promotion, in an activist sense, seems to have been put aside.
Those who believed to the contrary thus feel betrayed.
A remarkable feature of U.S. perceptions of West Asia is an inability or unwillingness to acknowledge linkages.
A good example of this is a bland assertion by a Council for Foreign Relations Task Force: "The United States should support democratic reform in the Middle East whether or not there is progress towards peace, as well as support progress towards peace whether or not there is significant democratic reform." A close examination of the track record would show that neither is viewed as relevant to the larger American purpose.
The retreat from the agenda of 2003 was forced upon by the Iraq misadventure. The Bush-Blair partnership has finally, albeit grudgingly, conceded that mistakes were made, that Abu Ghraib happened, that the Marines massacred innocent civilians, that resistance exists and was underestimated. The fallacy of the primary impulse, a conspiracy to invade and destroy Iraq, is yet to be acknowledged.
Even friends are distancing themselves. A remark attributed to Abraham Foxman of the anti-Defamation League is noteworthy: "We are basically telling the president: we appreciate (your pledge to defend Israel), we welcome it. But hey, because there is this debate about Iraq, where people are trying to put the blame on us, may be you shouldn't say it that often or that loud. Within the Jewish community there is a real sense of `thank you but no thank you.'"
Would a changing situation propel the U.S. administration to take the Israel-Palestine question more realistically and tell Israel that peace, and permanent borders, need to be negotiated with the Palestinians, not with the U.S.? This one act, leading to freedom from occupation, fear, and anarchy, would do more to promote freedom, peace, democracy and a better image of America than all the half-baked initiatives put together. [The Hindu, Friday, Jun 02, 2006]
posted by e-tafakkur at 1:51 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home